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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MASrrrc TILE DIVISION OF 
THE RUBE,ROID COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
A C l\1 E DISTRIBU;TING COM,-
PANY, a corporation, W. N. BEES-
LEY, SR., and SCOTT L. BEESLEY 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDE'N·T'S BRIEF 
Case No. 9957 
STA:TE.MEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was commenced December 14, 19'62: 
(1) To determine that there was due and owing 
from Acme Distributing Company to Respondent, the 
sum of $82,270.49. 
(2) To foreclose a Chattel Mortgage. 
(3) To collect all accounts receivable assigned to 
Respondent. 
( 4) For judgment for any deficiency remaining 
against Acme Distributing Company for the full amount 
of said deficiency and against the individual defendants 
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for the amount of said deficiency, but not to exceed the 
sum of $21,979.73. 
DISPOSlTION IN LOWER COUR!r 
The lowe·r court on June 10, 19·63, granted Summary 
Judgment in Respondent's favor for amounts found then 
due and owing, to-wit: $21,979.73 agarl.nst all Appellants 
and $19,005.73 with interest in the -amount of $9·60.00 and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,500.00 against Ap-
pellant, Acme Distributing Company. 
RELIE·F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask that the judgment be reversed and 
the matter tried on the merits. 
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~TATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Acme Distributing Company, for some 
years prior to the commencement of this law suit had 
been a distributor of the floor tile and related products 
of Respondent. Sometime during the first part of 1961, 
the controlling stock of Acme Distributing Company was 
transferred from W. N. Beesley, Jr., to his father, W. 
N. Beesley, Sr., one of the Appellants herein. At that 
time, Acme Distributing Company owed Respondent the 
sum of $81,278.91 on open account, all of which was past 
due. Acme Distributing Company desired to continue 
its relationship with Respondent, but Respondent could 
not pennit further extension of credit with such a large 
past due balance. After discussion and negotiation 
between the ·parties, certain documents were prepared 
and executed on March 10, 1961. 
The basic agreement between the parties reads : 
AGREEMENT 
"THIS AGRE:EMENT made and entered into by and 
between .A:CME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, hereinafter called "Acme," and MASTIC 
TILE DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID COMPANY, a 
New Jersey coropration, maintaining an office at 2340 
East Artesia, Long Beach, California, hereafter called 
"Mastic," 
WITNESSE1TH: 
.WHEREAS, Acme is indebted to Mastic in the 
amount of $81,278.91 and the same is past due, and 
WHEREAS, Acme desires to continue as a distribu-
tor of products sold by Mastic and to obtain credit for 
its further purchases from Mastic, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the cove-
nants herein set forth, it is agreed: 
1. Acme agrees to execute and deliver to Mastic 
its promissory note in ·the amount of $81,278.91 with 
3· 
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interest thereon at three (3%) per cent per annum, pay-
able at the rate of $2,0.00.00 or more per month com-
mencing on or before April 25, 1961, and· a like amount 
on or before the 25th day of each month thereafter until 
principal and interest aretfully paid. 
2. To secure the payment of said promissory note, 
Acme agrees: 
(a) To execute and deliver to Mastic a chattel mort-
gage on aU merchandise heretofore sold to Acme by 
Mastic and now held by Acme and on all merchandise 
hereafter sold to Acme by Mastic or the Ruberoid Com-
pany or any of its divisions or subsidiaries .. 
(b) To sell, as.sign and transfer to Mastic all of its 
accounts receivable now owned and all accounts receiv-
able which it may hereafter awn which represent products 
sold to it by Ruberoid Company, Mastic THe Division 
of the Ruberoid Company and any other division or sub-
sidiary of The Ruberoid Company. 
3. Acme agrees to prepare and forward. to Mastic 
on or before the lOth day of each month hereafter the 
following schedules in manner and form .prescribed by 
Mastic: 
(a) A schedule of all accounts receivable repre-
senting business done by Acme during the preceding 
month, together with a copy of each invoice or other 
evidence of indebtednes'S, each document to bear an exe-
cuted as.signment by Acme in manner and form pre-
,scribed by Mas.tic. 
(b) A schedule of payments on accounts thereto-
fore as,s1igned to Mast'ic by Acme received during the 
preceding month. 
4. From and after the 1st day of January, 1961, 
all purchases from Mastic by Acme shall be at two 
(2%) per cent discount if paid within sixty (60) days 
from the invoice date and net if paid thereafter, provided 
that all payments to Mastic shall be the net invoice 
amount, and if paid within the discount period, Mastic 
agrees to credit the discount to the unpaid balance of 
the pvomissory note mentioned above, provided further 
that all invoice·s ·shall be rpaid not later than seventy-five 
(75) days from invoice date. 
5. All books and records of Acme shall be open to 
inspection by Mastic, their officers, agents or employees 
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at all reasonable times, and Acme Agrees at its expense 
to furnish to Mastic quarterly a balance sheet and profit 
and loss statement attested to by a certified public ac-
countant not later than thirty (30) days after each 
quarter. Acme further agrees to furnish to Mastic a 
copy of its Federal Income Tax return duly certified to 
be such by the office of the District Director of Internal 
Revenue. 
6. Mastic agrees not to notify any obligor of Acme 
of the assignment of its account provided Acme is not 
in default in any payment herein reserved (note or open 
account) or other covenant or condition of this agree-
ment to be kept or performed by Acme. 
7. It is agreed that all sales, rebates from Mastic to 
which Acme may hereafter become entitled, except 
merchandise returns and adjustments, shall be credited to 
the promissory note mentioned above. 
8. In the event of default by Acme in the payment 
of any ins,tallment on said promis~sory note or on any 
item of open account or any other covenant or condition 
of this· agreement to be kept or performed by Acme, 
· all indebtedness owing to the Ruberoid Company, Mas-
tic Tile Division of the Ruberoid Company or any other 
division or subsidiary of the Ruberoid Company shall 
immediately be due and payable. 
9. In the event of default by Acme, Mastic may 
immediately proceed to collect the assigned accounts re-
ceivable of Acme and may as to each or any of such 
accounts compromise and settle the same without lia-
bility to.Acme. 
WITNESS the signatures of the Parties hereto this 
lOth day of March, 1961. 
ACME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC 
By W. N Beesley, Sr. 
MASTIC TILE DIVISION OF THE 
RUBEROID COMPANY 
By 0. A. Maggia 
Secretary 
·(Acknowledgements omitted) 
The ·promissory note menti·oned m. the agreement 
reads as follows: 
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$·81,278.91 
"PROMISSORY NOTE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
March 10, 1961 
FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt 
whereo.f is acknowledged, the undemigned, jointly and 
severally, promise to pay to the order of MA.IS'TIC TILE 
DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID COMPANY, a New 
Jersey corporation, with its office at 2340 East Artesia, 
Long Beach, California, the sum of EIGHTY ONE 
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT 
DOLLARS AND NINgTY-ONE CENTS ($87,278.91), 
with interest thereon at the rate of three (3%) per 
cent per annum. 'This note is payable in installments as 
follows: TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) or 
more on or before the 25th day of April, 1961, and 
TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) or more on 
or before the 25th day of each month .thereafter until 
principa'l and interest are fully paid. 
In case of default in payment of any of said install-
ments of principal and interest or any part thereof, it 
shall be optional with the legal holder of this note to 
declare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable, 
and proceedings may at once be instituted for the en-
forcement and collection of the same by ·Jaw. If this 
note is placed with an attorney for collection or if suit 
be instituted for collection, then in either event, the 
undersi,gned agrees. to pay reasonable attorney's fees. 
The makers and endovsers of this note severally 
waive presentment for payment, demand, protest and 
notice of nonpayment thereof and all defenses on the 
ground of any enension of the time of payment that may 
be given by the holder or holders to them or either of 
them. 
A:CME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC. 
By W. N. Beesley, Sr 
Its President" 
'The chattel mortgage mentioned in the agreement is 
part of the rooord (page 25) and will not be reproduced 
herein to conserve space. The portion of this instrument 
significant to this appeal is found on page 4 and reads: 
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44 This chattel mortgage is given to secure the 
paytnent of a promissory note in the amount of 
$81,~78.91 made and executed by said mortgagor 
and payable and delivered to mortgagee at its 
office in Long Beaoh, California, together with 
any further and additional loans or advances 
which the tnortgagee or holder hereof, shall make 
to the mortgagor." 
"Mortgagor agrees to pay all costs and ex-
penses in connection with the foreclosure hereof 
whether by advertisement or action, including 
reasonable attorney's fees." 
Also executed on March 10, 1961, was a supplemental 
agreement between the parties which reads : 
"SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREE·MENT made and entered into by and 
between ACME Distributing Company, a Utah corpora-
tion, herea£ter called "Acme" and MASTIC TILE DI-
VISION OF THE RUBEROID COMPANY, a New Jer-
sey corporation, maintaining an office at 2340 East Ar-
tesia, Long Beach, California, hereafter calied "Mastic." 
WITNESSE'TH : 
1. This agreement is supplemental to that certain 
agreement dated the loth day of March, 1961, between 
the parties hereto ·and, except as modified herein, is in 
full force and effect. 
2. lt is agreed that so 'long as Acme shall not de-
fault in any payment reserved in said agreement of 
March 10, 1961, (note or open acount) the amounts col-
lected by Acme on its accounts receivable assigned to 
Mastic, may be used by Acme in its ordinary course of 
business for business purposes, but not otherwise. Pay-
ments to Acme on said assigned accounts shall be ap-
plied to the oldest item or charge on the account. 
3. It is agreed that the first line of Paragraph 3 
(a) of the agreement of March 10, 1961, is amended to 
read as follows: 
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4. Mastic agrees that Acme may, in the ordinary 
course of bursiness, sell those goods, wares and merchan-
di-se within the lien of the chattel mortgage mentioned 
in the agreement of March 10, 1961, so long as Acme 
is not in default in any payment reserved in said agree-
ment or in any o1ther term or condition therein. 
WITNESS the s.ignatures of the parties hereto 
this lOth day of March, 1961. 
ACME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC. 
By W. N Beesley, Sr. 
MASTIC TILE DIVISION OF T'HE 
RUBEROID COMPANY 
By 0. A. Maggia 
Secretary" 
(Acknowledgments omitted) 
Appellants assert that this supplemental agreement 
was omitted from the pleadings and record in this case. 
It is readily seen that this supplemental agreement is 
not material to the issues of this c.ase or this appeal, but 
merely provides certain mechanics relating to the trade 
accounts assigned and the merchandise covered by the 
chattel mortgage. 
As further consideration .and to induce Respondent 
to grant further credit to Aeme ·and to continue the dealer 
relationship, Appellant, Acme, by separate instrument 
assigned to Respondent a debt in the amount of $21,-
979.73 whi·ch was owed to it by its former controlling 
stockholder, W. N. Beesley, Jr. This debt had been as-
sumed by the two individual Appellants. The assignment 
reads as follows : 
''A1SSIGNMENT 
WHEREAS, there is due to Acme Distributing 
Company, Inc. TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE 
HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE DOLLARS AND SEV-
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ENTY THREE CENTS ($21,979.73) from W. N. Bees-
ley, Jr,, a former officer of Acme Distributing Company, 
Inc., which, for a valuable consideration, has heretofore 
been as'sumed and guaranteed, jointly and severally, by 
W. N. Beesley, Sr. and Scott Low Beesley. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for a valuable consideration, 
receipt of which is acknowledged, Acme Distributing 
Company, Inc., does hereby sell, assign and transfer 
unto M.AJSTI'C TILE DIVISION OF THE RUBEROID 
COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation, the account or 
claim against said W. N. Beesley, Jr. in the amount set 
forth above. 
It is agreed between Acme Distributing Company, 
Inc. and Mastic Tile Division of the Ruberoid Company, 
assignor and as,signee· respectively, that this assignment 
shall be a part of that certain agreement between them 
dated March 10, 1961. 
Dated this lOth day of March, 1961. 
kCME DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC. 
By W. N. Beesley, Sr. 
Its President 
MASTIC TILE DIVlSION OF THE 
RUBEROID COMPANY 
By 0. A. Maggia 
Its Secretary 
The undersigned acknowledge that they are joint-
ly and severally liable to Acme Distributing Company, 
Inc. in the amount of $21,979.73 and consent to the 
foregoing Assignment. 
DATED this lOth day of March, 1961. 
W.N. Beesley, Sr. 
Scott L. Beesley" 
The intent of the parties is clearly shown by the 
above agreements. Acme in snhstance said: 
"We owe you over $81,000.00 which is p:ast 
due, but we want to continue to do business with 
you ·and obtain further credit. We are willing to 
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Mastic answers in effect: 
. "We will continue to do business with you 
if you will give us a Note for the current balance, 
se·cured by a mortgage on our merchandise and all 
merchandise hereafter ·acquired from us. This 
Mortgage ·is to secure this Note and also the fur-
ther advances which we make to you by extending 
credit. ·The Note is also to be secured by an as-
signment of your accounts receivable to the ex-
tent that they represent our merchandise soJd by 
you to your customers. In addition, two of your 
principal stockholders owe the company $21,-
979.73. We want that debt assigned to us as 
se·curity for payment of any indebtedne·ss that 
you may hereafter owe to us." 
After the commencement of the law suit, all accounts 
receivable that were collectable were colleeted and credit 
given. The merchandise covered by the chattel mortgage 
was returned to Respondent by agreement and credit 
given for the full invoice price less freight. These credits 
are as follows : 
Accounts Receivable Credit. _________________ $20,015.42 
Merchandise Credit --------------------·----------- 20,487.50 
'Thereupon, Respond~nt moved for Summary Judg-
ment against all appellants. The two individual appel-
lants moved for Summary Judgment in their favor. At 
the hearing om the motions of the parties, the amount of 
crerdit and the .amount due and owing was stipulated to 
by counsel. 
S.inc:e both parties were asking for Summary Judg-
ment, each in effect is saying that there is no m·aterial 
iss~e of fact and that one party or the other is entitled 
10 
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to judgment. The case then becomes simply a matter of 
the proper construction of the written instruments of 
the parties, which is a matter of law. 
The liability of the appellant corportion is admitted 
and the judgment against it is not subject to question. 
The real issue is whether the two individual app€Uants 
are liable to respondent :for the sum of $21,979.73. Basic-
ally, they contend that the assignment on the debt they 
owe the corporation was for the purpose of securing the 
notL' only. Respondent contends, that this assignment 
was security for any indebtedness the company owed 
Respondent. This was the construction placed upon the 
instruments by the lower court and judgment was enter-
ed accordingly. 
That thi~ is the only possible construction of the 
agreements between the parties will be shown by the 
argument set forth below. 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANT:ED BY THE LOW-
ER COURT WAS CORREGT IN ALL RESPECTS. 
Appellants under Point I in their Brief assert first 
that the credit for merchandise returned was improperly 
allocated between the Note and open account. They con-
tend that the merchandise credit should have been ap--
plied solely to the Note. This is simp~y a conclusion as-
surted by Appellants without reas'ons being given there-
for. AppeUants do not state that there are facts which 
will support their conclusion, nor do they point to any 
agreement of the parties in support of this conclusion. 
The Appellants have entirely overlooiked and ig-
nored the clear and unequivocal terms of the agreements 
between the parties. First of all, the agreement in its 
preamble states, 
"WHEREAS, Acme desires to continue as a 
distributor of products sold by Mastic, and to ob-
tain credit for its further purchases from Mastic." 
The language quoted from the contract clearly dem-
onstrates that the intent of the parties was to embrace a 
continuation of their business relationship and the· fur-
ther extension of credit. 
The mortgage exe'Cuted by Acme Distributing Com-
pany states the following: 
"'This Chattel mortgage is given to secure the 
payment of a promis.s'ory note in the amount of 
$81,278.91 made and exe~cuted by said mortgagor 
and payable and delivered to mortgagee at its 
12 
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office in Long Beach, California, together with 
any further and additional loans or advances 
which the mortgagee or holder hereof shall make 
to the mortgagor." 
The mortgage is a standard, open-end mortl2'arr"' ;.1 
common and general use throughout the financial world. 
[t covers a situation where two parties contemplate a 
continuity in business dealings and the further advance 
of money or goods. 
Clearly this mortgage covered not only the Note, 
but the further advances made by Respondent to Appel-
lant, Acme, represented by the open..:acccount purchases. 
After the commencement of the law suit, the merchandise 
was returned and a credit issued for the full invoice price, 
less freight. This credit is not in dispute and is exactly 
$20,487.50 (It is $163.36 higher than the sum mentioned 
in Paragraph 7 of Respondent's Affidavit in Support 
of Summary Judgment, but this figure was agreed upon 
and stipulated to by counsel before the hearing.) (See 
Judgment, Record 46.) 
Since the mortgage covered both the Note and the 
open account, this credit should be applied pro-rata as 
set forth in the Affidavit of Respondent in support of 
its motion for summary judgment. 
In the Utah case of Farr v. Rartley, 81 P. 2d 640 
(Utah), a series of Notes had been given, secured by a 
single mortgage on real property. On foreclosure, the 
question of the application of proceeds had arisen. The 
court stated and held: 
"·The only legal inference that can be made 
13 
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from the Finding o[ Fact is that the parties agreed 
that there would be no priority of payment out 
of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure. 
Where such an agreement exists, whether express 
or implied, a mortgagee is entitled to .share pro-
rata with assignee note holders in the proceeds 
of the property securing the notes where such 
proceeds are insufficient to pay the entire amount 
due." 
The only difference in the case at bar and the Farr 
case, supra, is that in the Farr case there were several 
holders of the several obligations. The principle of law, 
however, is the same. Where there are several obliga-
tions rurd the proceeds from the mortgaged property 
are insufficient to pay all, they should he applied pro ... 
rata. 
There was due to Respondent on said N·ote the sum of 
$47,250.00 and the sum of $35,020.69 on open account 
when the law suit was commenced. These two items bear 
a 42.3 per cent and 57.7 per cent ratio to the total. Apply-
ing this ratio to the $20,487.50 merchandise credit, there 
is applied $11,821.29 to the Note and $8,666.21 to the 
open account. 
'This is a proper accounting of the merchandise credit 
and the contention of Appellants that the entire credit 
should he applied to the note is a direct contradiction to 
the terms of the ~agreement and chattel mortgage. 
Appellants assert that the assignment of the $21,-
979.'73 deht owed by the individual appellants was for 
security purposes only and that no consideration was 
given therefor. We are not enlightened, however, as to 
14 
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what facts or agreements appellants rely on to prove 
their assertion. 
Here again, the agreements of the parties clearly 
Pxpressed show that the "contention" of appellants is 
not legally sound. 
First, as to the allegation of the two individual 
appellants that the assignment was given without con-
sideration. They can be eliminated from this phase 
of the controversy because they cannot legally raise the 
issue of want of consideration. In 6 Am. J ur. 2nd Assign-
ments Sec. 90 it is stated: 
"The defense that an assignment was made 
without consideration is not one. which the origiJllal 
debtor may raise when sued by the ass~gnee; the 
assignee may generally recover in an action 
·against the original debtor or obligor even though 
there was no consideration for the transfer as 
between the assignor and the assignee." 
The individual appellants owe the corporation $21,-
979.73. They acilmowledge their indebtedness in the in-
strument of .assignment. There is no basis upon which 
they can complain upon being compelled to pay a debt 
which they admittedly owe nor can they complain rubout 
being compelled to pay it to respondent. 
The appellant corporation also "contends" that no 
consideration was giv-en for the assignment. This con-
tention is also baseless ·and entirely refuted by the agree-
ments. 
·The parties expressly made the assignment part of 
the agreement of March 10, 1961 by reference. The con-
sideration given therefor is the promise of respondent 
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to grant further credit to Acme on its purchases. This 
is clearly understood in the agreement. This promise is 
sufficient consideration. In 10 Am. Jur., Pledge and 
Collateral Securities, Section 10, it is stated: 
"As in the case of contracts generally, the 
general rule is that a pledge must be supported 
by a· consideration. A sufficient consideration for 
the pledge of property may consist of a present 
loan, a further adva;ncement, a stipulation, ex-
press or implied, of further time in which to pay 
a pre-existing deht or a change of securities of a 
pre-existing debt." (Italics suppJied.) 
Appellants attack the attorney's fees of $4,500.00 
a warded by the court. 
At the conclusion of the argument of counsel on 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment, the court 
instructed counsel to see if an agreement could he reached 
on the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. Respond-
ent voluntarily reduced its claim for attorney's fees to 
the sum of $4,500.00. This figure was incorporated in the 
judgment to be entered by the court. Before the judgment 
was entered by the court, it was submitted to counsel 
for appellMts. The judgment c;ontains the following 
statement: 
"The above judgment is approved as to form 
and amount of attorney's fees." 
·This was interlined out by counsel for appellants, 
and the folowing written in: 
"Received a copy of the' foregoing proposed 
judgment and submit the mattter of attorney's 
fe-es to the court." 
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It is true that Respondent claiined in its Affidavit 
attorney's fees amounting in all to $8,200.00. This sum 
is approximately 10 per cent of the sums due and owing 
to 1\P~pondent at the time the law suit was commenced. 
Since the mortgage not only covers the note but also 
<·nn·r;:; further advances and provides that the mortgagor 
shall pay attorney's fees upon foreclosure, the sum 
originally claimed by Respondent is fair and reason-
able. 
However, when Respondent submitted the judgment 
to the Court for entry, it voluntarily reduced this claim 
to $4,500.00 and appeUan ts as quoted above submitted 
the matter of fees to the court for its decision. This is 
a reasonable fee for the collection of the note alone, with-
out even considering the collection of the further ad-
vances (see Utah State Bar Advisory Handbook on Of-
fice lJlanagement and Fees, 1961). 
Furthennore, appellants do not contend that the 
fee is not reasonable. They merely say they do not know 
how the same was assessed. Inasmuch as the fee is rea-
sonable for the collection of the note alone, the assess-
ment thereof is not material. 
Appellants also alleged that by proper application 
of the credits, the note might be paid and then no attor-
ney's fees could be assessed. In order to make such an 
assertion, appellants are looking through the wrong end 
of the barrel. Appellants have announced a novel legal 
theory for which there is no authority. In 143 ALR, Page 
693, it is stated: 
"Next to the nature and extent of the work 
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performed, the most important single factor in 
determining the amount of an attorney's compen-
sation is the amount of money invo~ved or the 
value of the proP'erty or rights in controversy." 
·This principle is always viewed from the standpoint 
of the amount in controversy at the time the law suit is 
commenced and not after the security has been sold and 
a deficiency determined. If it were otherwise as appel-
lants contend, the attorney's fees stipulated in notes 
secured by mortgages would he a nullity and would cer-
tainly work a result not intended by the contracting 
parties. 
Appellants have cited in their Brief certain Utah 
cases where the summary judgment granted by the lower 
court has been questioned. In each of those cases, the 
motion was resisted and if the judgment were reversed 
for trial, this court found that the showing made by the 
prevailing· party in the lower court did not "preclude all 
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which ·would reasonably substain a 
judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret Dodge ·Truck-
ing Center, Inc., 354 P. 2d 559 (Utah). 
T'his case is distinguishab~e. Here Respondent 
and the two individual appellants moved for judgment 
based on their interpretation of the written instru-
ments executed by the parties. The rule of Taylolf' v. 
D~ahl, 353 P. 2d. 988 (Utah) applies. In that case, "All 
parties mo:ved for summary judgment based on the plead-
ings and depositions of the parties. The court, thus, 
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was invited to construe the alleged contract in light 
of its terms and the depositions of the parties . . . The 
trial court, therefore, at the request of .all parties was not 
in error in construing the contract as not having been 
performed by the seller, and in justifying the refusal of 
the buyer to go ahead on the contract." 
The position of the individual appellants is one of 
inconsistency. In the trial court, they said in effect that 
there is no material issue of fact and requested judgment 
in their favor as a matter of law. When they lose, they 
reverse their position in this court and state that there 
is evidence which would support a judgment in their 
favor and, therefore, the case should be tried on the 
merits. 
Since the individual appellants in the lower court 
invited the court to construe the written instruments, 
they should be bound to that position in this court. The 
scope of inquiry on this appeal is whether the interpreta-
tion of the lower court is reasonably justified and not 
whether appellants can produce evidence which might 
support a judgment in their favor. 
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POINT II. 
THE PRO .. RATED CREDIT :LS CORRECT, BUT DOES 
NO,T EJFFEICT THE JUDGM.ENT OF THE COURT AND, 
THEREFOR~, IS NOT PR:mJUDI1ClA:t.. TO .. APPELLAN'T'S. 
~h~; two individual appeUants contend ~at the me·r-
chandise credit shoUld have ; been . applied only to the 
note balance; that it would then be substantially paid 
and that since the assignment 'was security for the note, 
their individu3l •liability would· be considerably reduced. 
Respondent.· pro-rated the merchandise credit, how-
ever, simply as a matter of correct accounting proced-
ure, 'based on the term of the mortgage providing that 
~he niei~chandise should he security for the note and 
future advances. 
T'he balance shown by pro-rating the credit are as 
fqllciws: · 
Open-Account 
Note Balance Balance 
D~ate of hearing on 
Summary Judgment ------------$~~,250.0.0. $34,238.38 
Credit merchandise·. · __ _. . . 
·returns_:.57. 7% ___ ..:_ _______________ ~--- 11,821.29 
Credit accounts 
receivable collected ---------------- 20,015.42 
Total, less attorney's 
fees and interest. _____________________ $15,413.29 
Interest 12/1/ 6·2 to 
June 10, 1963 ---------------------------- 170.00 





The assignment, however, was not merely security 
for the payment of the note, but also security for other 
indebtedness. This is the construction placed on the 
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agreements by the lower court and reflected in the judg-
ment of the court. Were it otherwise, judgment against 
the two individual appellants would have been for the 
sum of $20,283.29 instead of $21,279.73. 
Appellants also contend that they had not received 
eredit for the uncollected receivables and that this would 
make a difference in their liability. Were it the case that 
the accounts receivable had been given and accepted as 
payment rather than as security, there would be merit in 
appellants' contention. Further, Paragraph 9 of the 
agreement of March 10 is a complete answer to the -argu-
ment of appellants. It reads : 
"9. In the event 'Of defiault by Acme, Mastic 
may immediately proceed to collect the assigned 
accounts receivable of Acme and may as to each 
a.n.d any of such accounts compromise and settle 
the same without liability to Acme." 
Since the accounts receivable were assigned only as 
security and the power given to compromise and settle 
the same, neither of the appellants have the right to 
romplain about some of the accounts being uncollectruble 
or compromised for a lesse·r amount. 
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POINT III. 
THE ASSIGNED INDEBTEDNESS OF THE INDIVID-
UAL.APPELLANTS WAS ~SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT 
OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS OWING TO RESPONDENT BY 
ACME. 
As stated above (and by appellants), the real con-
troversey in this case is between Respondent and the two 
individual Appellants centering upon the assignment. 
Appellants first of all state that the assignment was for 
security only. Respondent has never contended other-
wise. Seeondly, appellants contend that the assignment 
was security for the payment of the note only. This is 
the point upon which the parties divide. The assignment 
was, in f.act, security for the payment of any indebted-
ness owed by Acme to Respondent and the agreements 
point to no other possible conclusion. 
First, the assignment of" March io, 1961, pro~des 
:that it shall be part of the agreement of March 10,·1961. 
Nowhere in the agreement is it stated that the assign-
ment is to be additional security for the payment of the 
note. What is to be security for the payment of the note 
is set forth quite clearly; a chattel mortgage on goods 
and an .assignment of the trade accounts. Second, the 
parties did specifically state that their business relation-
~hip would continue and that further credit w~uld be 
given. 
The only re,asonable inference from these agree-
ments is that the assignment must co:ver future indebted-
ness. Such .a pJedge is legally valid. In She,ffer v. Grif-
fiths, 245 P. 698 (Utah), this court states, 
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"That pledges are to be construed and en-
forced according to the interest of the parties as 
gathered from the instrument of pledge and the 
subject m'atter thereof, and that by agreement 
of the parties, the pledge may be applied, not only 
to secure the payment or performance of a par-
ticular liability or obligation, but also in payment 
or performance of all liabilities and obligatons of 
the pledgor, due, ·or to become due, existing when 
the pledge is given or thereafter contracted or 
acquired." 
One further point. The two individual appellants 
owe the amount of the assigned debt to the corporation. 
They so state in the written Assignment. The following 
rule applies : 
"As a general rule, the Assignee can reco<Ver 
the same amount from the debtor as the Assignor 
might have recovered if he had brought suit, and, 
when the legal title is in the Assignee, he may re-
cover the full amount of the obligation from the 
debtor, although he holds the chose as security 
for a debt or on trust for creditors." 6 C.J.S. 
Assignments, Section 100. 
If any rights or equity did exist as respects the 
assignment, they would belong to the Assignor, Acme, 
and not to the two individual debtors. Here again the 
two individual appellants had no standing to complain 
a;bout paying a debt they admittedly owe and since the 
corporate appellant owes to Respondent a sum in excess 
of the amount of the assignment, it ca.nnot complain about 
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CONCLUSION 
-On March 10, 19·61, Aeme owed to Respondent over 
$80,000.00 which was past due. Respondent and Acme at 
that time entered into an agreement providing that Acme 
would execute a note for the past due amount secured 
by a chattel mortgage and accounts receivable. In addi-
- tion, Acme assigned to Respondent a debt owing to it in 
the amount of $21,979·.73 as security for the further ex-
tension of credit that would be granted to Acme as. con-
templated by the agreement. 
Further credit was extended and later Acme default-
ed in its payments. Suit was commenced and the security 
of the goods and accounts reeeivahle realized. upon.. Mo-
tions for summary judgment were made by Respondent 
and the two individual Appellants. Sums owing and 
~urns paid were stipulated to by counsel. A OOJ.ance re-
mained that exceeded the as-signed debt. 
Judgment was entered by the lower court against 
Acme for the full balance, plus interest and attorney's 
fees and against the individual appellants for the amount 
of their de!bt to Acme and assigned to Respondent as 
aforesaid. 
On .appeal, the two individual appellants claim that 
all credits must he appHed to the note and that they are 
thereby suhstanially relieved of their liability because 
the assignment was security for the note only. The agree-
ments do not be!ar out the interpretation as:ked by the two 
appellants and, on the contrary, the only reasona:ble inter-
pretation of the agreements is that the assignment cov-
ered all deht owing by Acme. 
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This correct interpretation was adopted by the lower 
court a.nd the judgment of that court must therefore be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
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